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Existing theories typically focus on asymmetric information to explain de-
lays in bargaining. This is not always appropriate, particularly when the par-
ties are in a long-term relationship. This paper examines the incentive to
delay agreement (or innovation) when: there are multiple bargaining periods;
previous outcomes aﬀect the subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are
incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained. Current agreements aﬀect
parties’ claim on future surplus either by altering their default payoﬀs (histor-
ical bargaining/contractual positions) or by changing their relative contempo-
raneous bargaining strengths. Delay will occur at diﬀerent times depending
on which assumption applies. If agreement reduces the future default payoﬀs
of a party, delay is more likely when expected future surplus is lower. If in-
novation reduces current bargaining power, however, a party is more likely to
delay agreement when expected future surplus is larger. It is also argued that a
party with a narrowly deﬁned set of interests, like a craft union, is more likely
to delay than a party with broader interests. Key words: bargaining, delay,
incomplete contracts. JEL classiﬁcations: C78, D23.
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11 Introduction
One of the most dramatic industrial confrontations in recent times occurred between
the newspaper proprietors and the print unions in the United Kingdom during the
1970s and 1980s over the introduction of photocomposition. This new technology
allowed copy to be keyed into the computer, newspaper pages to be organised on a
computer screen, then for the printing plates to be made directly from photographs of
page bromides (Griﬃn 1983, p. 42, Martin 1981, p. 30). In terms of output, a linotype
operator could set only seven column lines per minute whereas the new electronic
typesetting technology increased this rate to 3000 column lines per minute. Given
the tight deadlines of newspapers, this diﬀerence was very signiﬁcant (Griﬃn 1983,
p. 42). Photocomposition ‘rendered obsolete many of the craft skills possessed by
the compositor’ as it ‘removed the need for linotype machines and linotype operators’
(Griﬃn 1983, p. 42). 1
The introduction of photocomposition was vehemently opposed by the print unions,
in particular by the National Graphical Association (NGA) that represented linotype
operators who set the metal type. Initially the NGA rejected a proposal for ‘front-
loading’, where journalists and salespeople typeset words directly without the use
of printers. Another proposal was rejected by Fleet Street union members in early
1977 (Willman 1986, p. 127). At The Times between November 1978 to November
1979 there was an industrial dispute over the introduction of new technology. The
agreement that resolved this dispute, although establishing a style composing-room,
1Also see Melvern (1986, p. 5).
2was only a partial reform. Further, this dispute enhanced the monopoly position of
the NGA at other titles such as the Daily Express and the Observer (Willman 1986,
pp. 128-29). Willman (1986) stated that:
Overall, therefore, the implementation of new technology in national
newspapers has been substantially delayed by union resistance, in the form
of strike action and of the imposition of costs (p. 129).
The dispute continued between the Rupert Murdoch, proprietor of the Sun, News
of the World the Times and Sunday Times and the Fleet Street print unions in the
1980s. This dispute was only settled in January 1987.2
Why wasn’t such an obvious surplus enhancing innovation made immediately?
There are several important characteristics of this dispute. First, as the parties
were in an on-going relationship it seems implausible that asymmetric information
between the parties could result in a dispute over ten years long.3 Second, as the
parties were in a long-term relationship any new agreement could act to aﬀect future
claims on surplus. The introduction of photocomposition would reduce the NGA’s
bargaining power and control over the workplace as it was their specialist skills,
and the restriction on supply, that distinguished its members from outside labour
(Griﬃn 1983, p. 44). Third, knowing that innovation would reduce their claim
on future surplus the print unions would require compensation for these losses. In
2The eventual settlement with the unions was 60 million pounds. This is compared with Drexel
Burnham’s estimate that the value of Murdoch’s four London papers rose from $300 million to $1
billion just by moving out of Fleet Street and that proﬁts jumped 85 per cent (Shawcross 1997, p.
236). This suggests that the innovation clearly increased total surplus.
3In fact, it was Murdoch’s secret printing plant at Wapping that helped resolve the dispute,
ending the delay in the introduction of the new technology, rather than the reverse.
3this case it was diﬃcult for the companies to provide adequate compensation. For
example, in 1985 Murdoch’s operation was so highly leveraged that the combined
earnings of all his companies did not pay his interest bill (Melvern 1986, p. 6). This
severely limited the amount he could borrow for compensation payments. Fourth,
the parties were unable to write a contingent contract. The invention of the new
technology necessitated renegotiation. Further, the labour market was subject to
recurrent bargaining given the inability of the parties involved not to renegotiate
(Willman 1983, p. 121).4
The model presented in this paper incorporates the above features to provide
a new explanation for delays in bargaining.5 In the model two parties can choose
to adopt a new innovation in each period of the game. (The basic model has two
periods.) The innovation generates a known surplus that can be shared between the
parties. Innovation, however, aﬀects each party’s claim on surplus in future periods.
When an immediate innovation adversely aﬀects a player’s future payoﬀ, that player
will only be enticed to accept innovation if the immediate returns are suﬃciently great
so as to compensate her for these future losses. If this is not the case, the player will
choose to delay, even if this reduces total surplus.
In the print union example above innovation reduced the future bargaining power
of workers. The removal of a closed shop would have a similar eﬀect. Alternatively,
a party may wish to delay innovation when the existing contract provides a default
4Also see Martin (1981, p. 96).
5Failure to adopt a change that increases total surplus is a form of delay (Kennan and Wilson
1993, pp. 45-46).
4payoﬀ that it will lose if they agree to the change. That is, innovation changes the
contract the parties use as a starting point for negotiations rather than altering the
relative bargaining powers of the parties. For example, some workplace rules provide
workers with on-the-job leisure.6 In this case, by agreeing to change the workers
would lose their default (on-the-job leisure) payoﬀ. This could reduce their claim on
surplus in future negotiations.7 In order to be induced to agree to change the union
would need to be compensated for both current and future losses. If this cannot be
achieved through an adequate compensation package or a credible promise of future
payments, a union will decline to innovate, even if the change is eﬃcient in the sense
that it would increase overall surplus.
The diﬀerent assumptions concerning how innovation aﬀects the bargaining solu-
tion generate important alternative predictions. From the basic model, when inno-
vation aﬀects the default payoﬀs a party with a high default, is more likely to delay
innovation. Further, delay is more likely when expected future surplus is lower. On
the other hand, a party that loses its bargaining power when facing an innovation, as
in the print union example, is also likely to oppose innovation. Given that it is more
likely to face a speciﬁc innovation that reduces its bargaining power, a craft union is
more likely to oppose change than a union with a broader constituency. In addition,
6Workpractices may involve: excessive demarcation; double handling; tea breaks or other idle
time; the use of the same number of workers per machine despite the use of new or improved tech-
nology; limiting output either per worker or per machine; or requiring excessive overtime (Willman
1986, p. 54). Further, technical change may aﬀect current working conditions, work allocation or
the speed of work, all of which may aﬀect an employee’s surplus (Willman 1986, p. 47).
7The assumption here is that existing work arrangements aﬀect the bargaining power of each
party, and hence the distribution of surplus. Cornﬁeld (1987) suggested ‘changes in labour relations
arrangements reﬂect and contribute to the continuous redistribution of authority in the employment
relationship and, therefore, to the capabilities of labour and management to guide their fortunes’
(p. 5).
5a party facing an innovation that reduces its bargaining power is more likely to delay
when future surplus is higher.
A major contribution of the model presented in this paper is that delays arise
without the presence of asymmetric information. In the literature, delays in bargain-
ing typically arise when there is some asymmetric information between the parties
(for a review see Osborne and Rubinstein 1990 and Muthoo 1999). With asymmet-
ric information, delays may occur because the informed party uses delay to signal
their bargaining strength. These delays, however, may not be lengthy as once the
bargaining strength of a party has been revealed it is in the interests of both parties
to reach agreement (Sutton 1986, Gul and Sonnenshein 1986 and Gul and Sonnen-
shein 1988).8 On the contrary, lengthy delays arise in the incomplete contracts model
presented here.
Some recent models have explained delays in the absence of asymmetric informa-
tion in diﬀerent contexts. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a and 1995b) showed there can
be delays in the presence of party-speciﬁc externalities. Other models have shown
that, with complete information, delays in bargaining can occur when there are multi-
ple equilibria and parties play complicated history-dependent strategies (for example
see Haller and Holden 1990, Fernandez and Glazer 1991, Avery and Zemsky 1994,
Busch and Wen 1995, Manzini and Mariotti 1997 and In and Serrano 2000). In con-
trast, the model presented in this paper has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Further, delay arises naturally when the bargaining parties play simple and realistic
8Further, if it is diﬃcult to screen diﬀerent bargaining parties from one another, delay may be
an ineﬀective screening device.
6strategies.
Finally, the model presented here has links to the hold-up literature. In the
incomplete contracts literature a party may ineﬃciently (under)invest when they do
not expect to receive the entire return from their investment. 9 In a similar manner,
parties in the model presented here take into account the eﬀect innovation will have
on renegotiation in subsequent periods; as a result, innovation (or ex ante investment)
may not be eﬃcient. In a related model, Hart and Moore (1994) studied optimal debt
contracts between a wealth-constrained entrepreneur and ﬁnancier in which ex ante
ineﬃciency can arise, in the sense that projects with a certain positive net return
are not ﬁnanced, because of incomplete contracts and wealth constraints. The two
models diﬀer, however. For example, in Hart and Moore the bargaining power at the
renegotiation stage is determined by the characteristics of the project (maturity, the
durability of the physical assets involved) whereas here the bargaining power of the
parties is determined by previous bargaining outcomes.
2 The model
This section outlines the model. There are two potential trading partners, denoted
here for convenience as a buyer and a seller. These parties may represent, for example,
a worker or her representative (seller) and a ﬁrm (buyer), however, these terms should
be interpreted in the broadest sense. All that is important is that they are two parties
9See Grout (1984) and Hart and Moore (1988). Similarly, Frankel (1998) developed a model of
creative bargaining in which parties underinvest in the search for options that increase bargaining
surplus as they do not receive the entire return generated by their investment.
7negotiating about the introduction of a surplus enhancing change in the relationship.
2.1 Timing
Figure 1 shows the time line of the model. There are two trading periods. At time
t = 1 there is an existing relationship between the parties given by a default contract.
This contract could merely describe the parties’ existing relationship. Alternatively,
it could represent a social norm or precedent.
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
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Figure 1: Time line of the model
At this point, an exogenous shock occurs. In the print union example this shock
was the development of the new computer technology. As a result of the exogenous
event it is revealed to both parties that if the seller performs task τ1 surplus v1
accrues to the buyer. Further, the performance of τ1 is incompatible with the activity
(and payoﬀ) the seller receives under the default contract. For example, the default
contract may involve some on-the-job leisure for the seller. The new task τ1, on the
other hand, could require the seller to work harder or at a constant speed. If the
worker agrees to make the innovation she can no longer receive her default surplus.
8Note that the required task in each period is peculiar to that period in that the
performance of τt only generates surplus in period t.10
After this information is revealed to both of the players, the two parties can rene-
gotiate the initial (default) contract. The bargaining process is discussed in section 3,
however, due to the primacy of the default a new contract can only be implemented
by mutual consent. After renegotiation, trade occurs according to the conditions of
the existing contract (either the default contract if at least one party rejected change
or according to the new contract if both parties agreed to innovate). Note also that
neither party can be forced to trade if they would receive a negative payoﬀ as the
players’ no-trade returns are normalised to zero. After trade, each party receives their
ﬁrst period payoﬀ.
The game then proceeds to the next period. This additional period captures the
on-going nature of the relationship between the parties. The second period has the
same structure as the ﬁrst. The existing contract acts as the default for both parties.
Once again, an exogenous event occurs. In light of this new information, it becomes
apparent to the two parties that the performance of τ2 by the seller generates surplus
v2 for the buyer. This is revealed to both parties and they can then renegotiate their
default contract. After renegotiation, trade takes place according to the conditions
of the relevant contract, the players receive their payoﬀs and the game ends.
10The same results arise when τt generates surplus in all future periods but each party cannot
commit not to trigger renegotiation.
92.2 Assumptions
Under the initial default contract at t = 1 the seller receives surplus of b ∈ [0,min{v1,v2}),
where the buyer’s return is normalised to zero. As b < min{v1,v2}, innovation must
occur in every period in order for total available surplus to be maximised. This is
summarised in the following remark.
Remark 1. Adoption of the innovation is eﬃcient in every period.
Prior to its revelation in period t, τt cannot be contracted upon. After it has
been revealed τt becomes veriﬁable and the two parties may write a contract on this
variable. On the other hand, the potential surplus vt is never veriﬁable, even in period
t. As such, a surplus sharing rule is not a permissible contract. This is similar to
assumptions elsewhere in the literature.11 Further, it is assumed that the seller must
perform the task τt, perhaps because of specialisation. Consequently, as in Hart and
Moore (1988) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), the buyer and the seller may
not vertically integrate to overcome their bargaining problem. This is an important
assumption because if the parties could integrate, for example, by the buyer selling
stock to the seller or by the creation of a surplus sharing rule, the incentives to delay
innovation could be eliminated.
An important element of the model relates to the parties’ inability to provide com-
plete up-front compensation. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that neither party
has access to outside sources of ﬁnance and wealth is normalised to zero. Although
11For example, in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is unveriﬁable to the ﬁnancier
preventing the parties from writing an ‘enforceable proﬁt-contingent contract’ (p. 95).
10this seems like an extreme assumption, it is not essential that the parties have zero
wealth or no borrowing capabilities. All that is important is that the parties access
to funds is limited in comparison with the compensation required. Limited ability to
borrow funds may arise because the parties could expropriate surplus or manipulate
ﬁnancial reports. Another possible reason is that utility may not be able to be trans-
ferred between parties, or there may be limits on such transfers. This would be the
case when one of the parties received a payoﬀ that was intrinsic to themselves.12 If
the buyer could borrow against future earnings, full compensation could be paid to
the other party at the outset of the bargaining process, allowing innovation to occur
immediately.
The objective of both of the parties is to maximise their expected surplus. To
simplify the analysis, the parties do not discount second period payoﬀs. The inclusion
of discount factors would only serve to scale second period returns.
3 The bargaining solution
The division of surplus resulting from renegotiation is composed of two elements.
First, this model adopts the reduced form bargaining solution used by Chiu
(1998).13 In this bargaining game outside options only aﬀect the division of sur-
plus if players can credibly commit to engaging them in the appropriate subgames.
If this is not the case, the outside options do not aﬀect the outcome of the game.
12Frankel (1998) studied bargaining when both utility is transferrable (so that side payments are
allowed) and when it is not (no side payments are allowed).
13This bargaining solution is, in fact, a reduced form solution based on the alternating-oﬀers
bargaining game with outside options of Shaked and Sutton (1984).
11As shown in the property rights literature (see Chiu 1998 and De Meza and Lock-
wood 1998) the form of bargaining solution used can signiﬁcantly alter the predictions
of the model. Consequently, it is important that the bargaining solution chosen is
appropriate to the applications in mind. Here, it is appropriate to adopt the outside
option rule as the assumption is that the outside option (default) can only be enacted
if negotiations are abandoned for that period. As a consequence, the seller is unable
to adopt the option while continuing to bargain (as would be the case with an inside
option). The threat to enact the default option will only be credible if it is binding.
In this model the seller has an initial outside option b provided by the default con-
tract; as a result it is the adoption (or otherwise) of a potential innovation aﬀects the
default payoﬀs of the parties and their claim on surplus.
Consider the bargaining solution that applies in the ﬁrst period if there is in-
novation in that period or in the second period provided innovation did not occur
previously. If, upon renegotiation, the parties agree to adopt a new contract in pref-
erence to the default, they divide the surplus in the following manner:
{αvt,(1 − α)vt} if b ≤ αvt; or (1)
{b,vt − b} if b > αvt. (2)
where the ﬁrst element is the return to the seller, the second the return to the buyer
and α ∈ [0,1].
Temporarily ignoring the outside option, if innovation occurs the parties split the
12surplus with the seller and buyer receiving α and (1−α) of the total available surplus
respectively. This is the solution presented in equation 1. In this case α reﬂects the
relative bargaining power of each of the players in the renegotiation process.14 As
discussed above, when the seller’s share of the surplus inside the relationship (αvt) is
less than the outside option, the seller receives a payment equal to her default payoﬀ
b. This is the bargaining solution presented in equation 2.
Now consider the bargaining outcome in period t = 2. As τt only generates
surplus in period t, if innovation occurred in the ﬁrst period the period t = 1 contract
(specifying the performance of τ1) generates no surplus in the second period. It is
assumed that neither party can be forced to undertake a trade that yields a negative
utility. Clearly, the ﬁrst period innovation contract will provide the buyer with a
negative surplus in period t = 2 as τ1 generates no surplus while the contract requires
a payment to be made to the seller. In this case the buyer will opt for not to trade.
Consequently, despite the t = 1 contract, the eﬀective default for the parties is the
no-trade payoﬀ. Moreover, as innovation has already occurred, the seller’s initial
default payoﬀ b no longer applies. As such, after innovation in the ﬁrst period, the
default payoﬀs in t = 2 are zero for both the buyer and the seller.
Following the discussion above, if innovation has previously occurred, the bargain-
14The relative bargaining strength of the players perhaps reﬂects each party’s expectation of
making the ﬁrst oﬀer, as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Sutton (1986). Alternatively, it
may relate to exogenous rates of time preference (Rubinstein 1982). Another possible interpretation
is that α reﬂects the perceived probability of a irreconcilable exogenous breakdown in bargaining
(Binmore et al 1986). It may also reﬂect a party’s position in the market place. This issue is
discussed further in section 5.
13ing solution then reduces to:
{αvt,(1 − α)vt} (3)
if the parties agree to innovate at time t = 2.
Second, in addition to the division of surplus speciﬁed by the bargaining rule,
either party can oﬀer a transfer Ft to the other party paid for out of their share of
the surplus. The inclusion of this additional ﬁxed payment allows either party to pay
compensation to the other for any future costs (or potential losses) that result from
innovation. Ft is an intertemporal transfer that can be considered as separate from the
extensive form bargaining game that results in the division of surplus outlined above.
In fact, one of the purposes of the model is to explore situations in which a party
may refuse to innovate despite the presence of compensation. Again returning to the
union-ﬁrm workplace negotiation example, Ft could represent redundancy payments
or a sign-on bonus. As a convention Ft is a payment made by the buyer to the seller.
As both parties cannot borrow and have zero wealth, Ft cannot exceed the amount
of surplus available to the party in that period.15 The total payoﬀs to either party
are their bargaining returns net of any transfer payments.
4 Delay in bargaining
The objective of each player is to maximise their expected total surplus over the entire
game. As this is two period model with complete information the game may be solved
15In the second period the party has access to the surplus they have received from both period
t = 1 and period t = 2. Second period ﬁxed payments can be made by a player using their ﬁrst
period returns. However, this does not turn out to be an issue in this game.
14by backwards induction so as to ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). This
section breaks down the analysis of the game into stages. The ﬁrst stage analyses
the second period innovation decision of both parties. The second stage analyses the
buyer’s ﬁrst period decision. The next stage assesses the seller’s decision to innovate
in the ﬁrst period for various values of b. The main objective of this analysis is to
assess whether a delay in innovation can exist as part of a SPE.
4.1 Second period reform
First, consider the decision to adopt innovation in the second period for both of the
parties. Reform will always occur in the second period, regardless of the outcome
in the ﬁrst period. If reform occurred in the ﬁrst period the default contract is the
period t = 1 agreement. As noted above, the performance of τ1 in period t = 2
does not generate any surplus for the buyer. The t = 1 contract will also require a
payment from the buyer to the seller. As a result, the buyer will not trade on the
terms of this contract as his return would be negative. The buyer would choose not
to trade according to the default contract as he prefers the zero payoﬀ of no trade.
Consequently, the eﬀective default return of the seller is also zero, as there will be
no trade in the second period with the period t = 1 contract. Further, as innovation
occurred in the ﬁrst period, the seller will not receive her initial default surplus of b.
Once τ2 and v2 are revealed the parties can renegotiate from the default contract.
As both parties have a default payoﬀ of zero, if they agree to innovate the division
of surplus is {αv2,(1−α)v2} to the seller and buyer respectively. Clearly, it is in the
15interests of both parties to agree to innovation in this situation. No ﬁxed payment
(F2) is required to encourage one party or the other to agree to the second period
innovation.
Now consider the decision whether or not to innovate in period t = 2 when no
innovation took place in the ﬁrst period. Again, once τ2 and v2 have been revealed
the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate and adopt the innovation. In this
case the default payoﬀs for each of the parties are given by the initial defaults; that
is, b and zero for the seller and buyer respectively. As b < v2, the parties can increase
total surplus in the second period by adopting the innovation. Given that the second
period is the last in the game, there is no strategic advantage to either party from
delaying innovation. Further, as innovation increases total surplus, at least one party
can be made better oﬀ without making the other party worse oﬀ. Consequently, both
parties will always adopt the second period innovation. The division of the surplus is
given by equation 1 or 2.16
In summary, both parties will agree to innovation in the second period, regardless
of the outcome in the ﬁrst period. This is summarised in Result 1.
Result 1. Innovation will always occur in period t = 2, regardless of the outcome in
the ﬁrst period.
16In fact, the buyer will always be made better oﬀ by reform in the second period, whereas the
seller may receive the same payoﬀ as she would have received had innovation not occurred. As b < vt,
the two alternative payoﬀs for the buyer, v2 − b and (1 − α)v2, are always positive. For the seller,
the second period return from innovation is at least as good as her default payoﬀ: if b < αv2, her
return is greater with innovation; if b > αv2 her return is the same with innovation as it is without
it. Given this indiﬀerence we assume that she will agree to reform as it does not make her worse oﬀ.
Alternatively, we could assume that the buyer undertakes to make a ﬁxed payment F2 = ε where ε
is arbitrarily small so as to make the seller strictly prefer innovation.
16The following remark relates directly to Result 1 and Remark 1.
Remark 2. As innovation always occurs in period t = 2 total surplus is maximised
in the second period.
Following from Remark 2, if any welfare loss occurs it will occur in the ﬁrst period.
An important element of Result 1 is that in equilibrium neither player requires
any compensation (or additional encouragement) to agree to reform, as both players
weakly prefer innovation over no innovation. As such, F2 = 0 , as summarised in the
following remark.
Remark 3. In equilibrium, F2 = 0.
4.2 The buyer’s ﬁrst period decision
Now consider the buyer’s decision to innovate in the ﬁrst period. The buyer will never
wish to delay innovation at t = 1. The intuition for this result is as follows. The buyer
can only do better in the second stage from innovation in period t = 1 as the seller
loses her default, improving the buyer’s claim on future surplus in some cases. The
worst the buyer can do in the ﬁrst period if innovation occurs is to earn a return of
zero. This would occur when the additional inducement payment to the seller F1 was
equal to his entire bargaining claim of surplus in the ﬁrst period. So, if the parties
reform at t = 1, in the ﬁrst period the buyer is never worse oﬀ than when there is no
innovation. Likewise, when there is ﬁrst period innovation the buyer is never worse
oﬀ in the second period. Moreover, the buyer strictly prefers ﬁrst period innovation.
17This is because when the buyer is indiﬀerent in period t = 1 he will strictly gain from
ﬁrst period innovation in the second period of the game, as summarised by Result 2.
Result 2. In a SPE the buyer never wishes to delay innovation in the ﬁrst period.
The result allows us to focus on the seller’s decision to delay. Clearly, as the buyer
will always agree to innovation in the ﬁrst period, it is the seller in this model who
may act strategically to delay innovation.
Another important element of Result 2 is that the buyer will be willing to forgo
his entire claim on ﬁrst period surplus, via the ﬁxed payment F1, to induce the seller
to accept innovation at t = 1. This is restated in the following remark.
Remark 4. In equilibrium, if necessary the buyer is willing to set the ﬁxed payment
F1 equal to his entire bargaining share of v1.
4.3 The seller’s ﬁrst period decision
The seller’s decision to delay or adopt the innovation depends on the relative payoﬀs
of two alternatives, namely her two period payoﬀ from delaying innovation in the ﬁrst
period (and accepting it in the second period) and her total payoﬀ from accepting
innovation at t = 1. If she delays innovation in the ﬁrst period, her total payoﬀ
is her default b in the ﬁrst period plus her claim on second period surplus. (From
Result 1, innovation will always occur in the second period.) If the seller accepts ﬁrst
period innovation her total expected utility is her ﬁrst period claim on surplus, plus
any ﬁxed payments F1 from the buyer, as well as her claim on second period surplus
18given innovation in the ﬁrst period. In any SPE, the seller will act to maximise her
expected utility from both periods.
Consider the seller’s decision in period t = 1 when b < αv1 and b < αv2. As
b < αv1 the seller’s surplus from agreement in the ﬁrst period is αv1, not including any
additional payment F1 from the buyer. Thus, anticipating the outcome the bargaining
game in the second period given that innovation has occurred in the ﬁrst period, the
expected total surplus of the seller from both periods is αv1 + αv2. Alternatively, if
the seller chooses to delay reform in the ﬁrst period she will receive a payoﬀ equal to
her (default) outside option, b. Again, anticipating her claim on the surplus in the
second period, her total expected utility is b + αv2.
In this case, it is apparent that the seller will never wish to delay innovation. To
see this consider the expected delay payoﬀ minus the expected payoﬀ to the seller
when she accepts ﬁrst period innovation (without any F1). This relative payoﬀ is
b − αv1 < 0. If b < αv1 and b < αv2, ﬁrst period innovation is always in the interests
of the seller as she does better with innovation than without it. Further, as reform is
in the seller’s interests, the buyer does not need to oﬀer any additional payment F1
to induce the seller to adopt change.
Now consider the case when b < αv1 and b > αv2. If the seller accepts ﬁrst period
innovation her expected payoﬀ is αv1 + αv2 plus any ﬁxed payment F1 forthcoming.
This is because when αv1 < b the seller’s default is binding if innovation takes place.
On the other hand, if the seller delays ﬁrst period innovation her utility is b+b. This is
the case as the outside option is only binding in the second period. The relative payoﬀs
19from when the seller delays innovation and when she agrees to it is b+b−[αv1+αv2].
If [b−αv1]−[b−αv2] < 0, the seller beneﬁts from immediate innovation. As before,
there is no delay and F1 = 0. If, however, [b−αv1]−[b−αv2] > 0, there is an incentive
for the seller to delay. As the return from delay exceeds the expected return to the
seller from immediate innovation, the buyer needs to make a payment F1 to the seller
to make her at least indiﬀerent between the payoﬀ when she delays innovation as
compared with when innovation occurs immediately. As the buyer has limited funds,
he can only make a payment out of his claim on the ﬁrst period’s surplus. Thus,
the largest possible F1 the buyer can make is (1 − α)v1. Thus, delay will only occur
when the buyer cannot adequately compensate the seller for the loss she will incur if
innovation occurs in the ﬁrst period (relative to her expected delay payoﬀ). That is,
Buyer’s funds < Net gain to seller from delay.
Thus delay will occur if






Of course, if b ≤
(v1+αv2)
2 , the buyer will be able (and willing) to adequately com-
pensate the seller. If this is the case, the seller will agree to immediate reform.
Furthermore, if b ≤
(v1+αv2)
2 , the buyer will set F1 < v1 − b, so as to make the seller
just indiﬀerent between reform and delay. A larger F1 would not alter the seller’s
20decision to innovate but would merely act to reduce the buyer’s surplus. The implicit
assumption here is that the buyer has all the bargaining power as regards to the
compensation payment F1. Any alternative assumption, for example that the seller
can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the buyer, will not aﬀect the incidence of delay.
It will merely act to alter the distribution of surplus.
Now consider when b > αv1 and αv2 > b. If the seller delays ﬁrst period innovation
her expected surplus is b+αv2. Alternatively, if the seller agrees to innovation in the
ﬁrst period her expected return is b+αv2, plus any ﬁxed payment F1. As the seller’s
payoﬀ is the same in both cases, there is no incentive for her to delay innovation.
Given this, F1 = 0.
Finally, when b > αv1 and b > αv2, the seller will receive b + b if she delays ﬁrst
period innovation. On the other hand, she will receive b+αv2, plus any ﬁxed transfer
F1 forthcoming, if she agrees to innovate immediately. In this case, the seller’s delay
payoﬀ relative to her innovation payoﬀ, without any ﬁxed payments, is b − αv2 > 0.
The seller requires some compensation for t = 1 innovation. Adequate compensation
is not possible if F1 < b − αv2. This is the case when





(v1 + αv2). (7)
On the other hand, if b ≤ 1
2(v1+αv2), the buyer can provide the seller with adequate
21compensation, and innovation will be immediate.
The discussion above is summarised in the following result.
Result 3. (a) In an SPE the seller will accept innovation in the ﬁrst period when:
(i) b < αv1 and b < αv2 ; (ii) b < αv1, b > αv2 and 2b−αv1 −αv2 < 0; (iii) b < αv1,
b > αv2 and b ≤ 1
2(v1 + αv2) ; (iv) b > αv1 and b < αv2; or if (v) b > αv1, b > αv2
and b ≤ 1
2(v1 + αv2). (b) The seller will delay innovation in the ﬁrst period as part
of an SPE if: (i) b < αv1, b > αv2 and b > 1
2(v1 + αv2); or if (ii) b > αv1, b > αv2
and b > 1
2(v1 + αv2).
Result 3(b) demonstrates that in certain circumstances the seller may act strate-
gically and delay the adoption of a surplus enhancing innovation so as to increase her
overall expected payoﬀ. If agreement reduces a player’s claim on future surplus they
will require some compensation if they are to accept the change. Without suﬃcient
up-front compensation, or a credible commitment to future payments, a party may
wish to delay a surplus enhancing innovation. Consequently, at the end of period
t = 1, even though it may appear that the parties have forgone a potential Pareto
reform, they are in fact maximising their own surplus in the multi-period game. Fur-
ther, where appropriate, a bargain should be considered as a continuing relationship
as this signiﬁcantly alters the analysis.
Following from Remark 1, when delay occurs total surplus is not maximised. This
is summarised in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If Result 3(b) holds, so that innovation is delayed, total surplus is not
maximised.
22Now consider some comparative statics of the model. Deﬁne ∆U as the seller’s
expected payoﬀ over the two periods from delaying agreement minus her expected
payoﬀ over the two periods if she accepts innovation in the ﬁrst period.17 Each of the
equations below relates to the seller’s decision to innovate when she is just indiﬀerent
between innovation and delay, that is, when ∆U = 0. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of b
when b < αv1 and b > αv2:
∂∆U/∂b = 2 > 0. (8)
An increase in the outside option b increases the incentive for the seller to delay. By
accepting innovation, the seller gives up her outside option in the second period - this
is a cost of innovation. An increase in b means that the outside option allows the
seller to capture more surplus in the second period as her outside option is binding
in that period. This means it is less likely that the buyer can provide adequate
compensation. Further, an increase in b increases the seller’s default payoﬀ in the
ﬁrst period, decreasing the cost of forgoing that period’s surplus from reform (in the
form of payment F1).
Next, consider the eﬀect of a change in α:
∂∆U/∂α = −v2 < 0. (9)
An increase in α decreases the incentive for the seller to delay ﬁrst period innovation.
17Speciﬁcally, let US
D be the seller’s ex ante expected utility when she does not agree to the ﬁrst
period innovation. Further, let US
A be the seller’s ex ante expected utility when she does agree to
the period t = 1 innovation. From this, ∆U = US
D − US
A.
23α represents the seller’s claim on surplus in any period when the default is irrelevant.
Thus a higher α indicates that the seller will get a greater share of the surplus from
any innovation, disregarding the default. Consequently, an increase in α reduces the
cost to the seller of forgoing her default b, decreasing the compensation needed to
induce innovation.
Both b and α represent diﬀerent forms of bargaining strength. b represents a
historical default or contractual right that acts as a minimum the seller must receive.
On the other hand, α could represent current bargaining strength in the renegotiation
process. α represents the seller’s negotiation skills or patience relative to those of the
buyer, regardless of any historical options. Although there may be some correlation
between b and α, this is not necessarily the case. For example, a union may have as
a default position rights and conditions that were obtained in a diﬀerent bargaining
environment. In negotiations, the union can then refuse any change that fails to
provide its members with at least the same level of surplus as this default. However,
unions may diﬀer in their ability to bargain with an employer in the absence of a
default.
Next consider the eﬀect of v1 when b < αv1 and b > αv2:
∂∆U/∂v1 = −1 < 0. (10)
An increase in v1 decreases the incentive for the seller to delay ﬁrst period innova-
tion. An increase in v1 increases the probability that the buyer can aﬀord adequate
compensation.
24Finally, consider the eﬀect of a change in v2 when b < αv1 and b > αv2:
∂∆U/∂v2 = −α > 0. (11)
An increase in v2 decreases the expected loss from innovation at t = 1 in the second
period as it increases the seller’s bargaining claim without her default b.
The same comparative statics apply when b > αv1 and b > αv2 .
5 Drastic innovation and bargaining power
Some innovations dramatically alter a party’s potential bargaining power. For ex-
ample, the removal of a closed shop could reduce a union’s ability to exact surplus.
Realising that such a reform will aﬀect its future negotiating potency, a union would
require additional concessions if it were to be induced to accept such a reform. More
generally, any innovation that shifts a party (the buyer) from a speciﬁc to a general
relationship will drastically reduce the other party’s bargaining power.18 Another
example would be a reform that eliminates the need for the special skills of a par-
ticular agent in the production process so that other (outside) parties can compete
for supply. As their skill or input is no longer essential, innovation causes the agent
to lose their leverage over the other bargaining agent. To distinguish clearly the two
diﬀerent potential eﬀects of innovation, denote an innovation that reduces the seller’s
contemporaneous bargaining power as a ‘drastic’ innovation.
18See Shaked and Sutton (1984).
25To examine delays in bargaining with drastic innovation consider the following
alterations to the basic model. First, suppose the seller’s initial default is zero (b =
0). In the ﬁrst bargaining period, if the agreement occurs the division of surplus
is {αv1,(1 − α)v1} to the seller and buyer respectively. If not, each player receives
a payoﬀ of zero (their default payoﬀ). In the second bargaining period assume the
bargaining rule is altered such that if innovation has occurred at time t = 1 all of the
surplus accrues to the buyer; that is, the division is {0,v1} .19 Clearly, innovation
eliminates any claim that the seller might have on surplus in future periods. If, on
the other hand, no innovation took place in the ﬁrst period, the division of surplus is
{αvt,(1 − α)vt} for the buyer and seller respectively, as given by equation 1.
As discussed previously, innovation will occur in the last period regardless of the
outcome in the ﬁrst period. Thus, if agreement occurred in the ﬁrst period, the seller’s
expected return is zero (regardless of the value of v2). If reform did not occur, the
period t = 2 return for the seller is αv2.
In the ﬁrst period, when deciding whether or not to agree to immediate innovation,
the seller will take into account the potential loss in the second period. Delay will
occur when
F1 + αv1 < αv2. (12)
As the buyer never wishes to delay innovation, he is willing to make the ﬁxed payment
equal to the highest feasible payment; that is, he is willing to set F1 = (1 − α)v1. As
19An alternative model might not have reform reduce α completely, but rather have innovation
reduce α by a fraction between zero and one.
26such, delay will occur when
αv1 + (1 − α)v1 = v1 < αv2. (13)
Conversely, the seller will accept immediate innovation when v1 > αv2 . In this case
the seller can always receive adequate compensation for her loss in future bargaining
power.
Unlike the basic model, the incentive to delay is increasing in α
∂4U/∂α = v2 > 0. (14)
This, at ﬁrst appearance, is a seemingly diﬀerent result to prediction of the previous
section. In the basic model the default b represented historical bargaining strength,
and a seller was more likely to delay innovation in the ﬁrst period, at the margin,
given an increase in b. Innovation, however, caused the seller to lose this default. In
the model in this section, innovation diminishes the bargaining power of one of the
parties. As such, what the seller forgoes by accepting innovation in the ﬁrst period
is increasing in α. In this manner, the results relating to these two variables are
consistent.
Finally, the comparative statics for v2 is
∂∆U/∂v2 = α > 0 (15)
27suggesting an increase in future surplus, at the margin, increases the incentive to
delay ﬁrst period innovation.
6 Predictions of the model
The two diﬀerent speciﬁcations allow for diﬀerent predictions, however. The ﬁrst two
predictions below relate to the basic model. The third relates to the model of drastic
innovation. The last contrasts the two models.
Prediction 1. A party with a strong historical position (b) is more likely to delay
innovation.
Prediction 1 follows from equation 8. It suggests, for example, that a union that
has won generous conditions for its members over time, reﬂecting its historical position
of strength, is less likely to accept innovation.
Prediction 2 follows from equation 9.
Prediction 2. A party with a strong claim on current surplus (bargaining power α)
is more likely to accept innovation.
An example of this would be a worker with speciﬁc skills who is required by the
ﬁrm for the new technique or process to be used. Conversely, an agent with relatively
weak claim on current surplus is more likely to delay innovation. This is the opposite
prediction of most of the asymmetric information bargaining models in which it is
the strong agent who endures delay in order to signal their bargaining strength to the
other party.
28The following prediction relates to the drastic innovation model, and in particular
to equation 14.
Prediction 3. The stronger the initial bargaining strength of a party facing a drastic
innovation (α goes to zero), the more likely they are to reject innovation.
Prediction 3 suggests that a party that faces an innovation that reduces its bar-
gaining strength is more likely to oppose innovation. For example, a craft based union
is more likely to oppose innovation than a union that represents a broader range of
occupations and interests. This is the case because innovation (new technology) is
more likely to reduce a craft based union’s bargaining power, whereas a broader union
may be better placed to capture any increase in surplus. This prediction accords with
the conclusion of Dowrick and Spencer (1994). They argued that union opposition to
innovation tends to occur when union preferences are weighted in favour of jobs and
labour demand is inelastic. Given the assumption that the elastic of demand is lower
at the industry level than at the enterprise level, they concluded that industry or
craft based unions are more likely to oppose technical change than enterprise unions.
Willman made a similar argument comparing the diﬀering patterns of resistance to in-
novation from decentralised unions in the UK with the corporatist unions in the then
West Germany (Willman 1986, p. 33). Furthermore, taken together, Prediction 2 and
Prediction 3 suggest a party is more likely to hold-out on a general investment that
reduces their bargaining power than a speciﬁc innovation that maintains or enhances
their bargaining position. 20
20See Malcomson 1997 for a discussion of speciﬁc and general investments.
29Finally, Prediction 4 relates equations 11 and 15.
Prediction 4. A party with a strong historical default is more likely to delay when
future surplus is to be low (basic model). A party facing drastic innovation is more
likely to delay when future surplus is to be high (drastic innovation model).
¿From the basic model, in order to accept ﬁrst period innovation the seller requires
suﬃcient compensation to cover her losses in the second period that are equal to
b − αv2. For a given v1 and α, as v2 decreases relative to v1 the size of b required for
delay to occur decreases. On the contrary, for drastic innovation delay requires that
v1 < αv2. This is never the case when v1 > v2. Further, as v2 increases relative to
v1, it becomes less likely that adequate compensation can be made. As a concrete
example, consider a union bargaining with a ﬁrm. The basic model suggests that
a union is more likely to reject innovation when the industry is in decline, or when
future surplus is low. 21 A lower future surplus means that the default would have
a greater impact on the union’s share, making it less likely that the ﬁrm can make a
suﬃcient compensation payment.22 On the other hand, the drastic innovation model
suggests that employees in a declining industry would accept innovation immediately.
Instead, a union would delay innovation when future surplus is (suﬃciently) higher
than today’s potential surplus. This would be the case in an industry that expected
a growth in demand (ignoring possible entry of other suppliers).
21Future surplus may be low because of the impending removal of regulations or the introduction
of new competitors, as well as in an industry with declining demand.
22This discussion does not consider the possibility that the default exceeds the potential surplus
from innovation in the future.
307 Inﬁnite horizon
With the two period model the seller’s decision is whether to wait and accept innova-
tion immediately or whether to accept it in the next (and ﬁnal) period. In reality, as
bargaining is typically an on-going process, both parties must decide in which period
they wish to accept innovation, if at all. This section extends the model to an inﬁnite
horizon.
Consider a model where potential innovation produces a surplus of v in every
period. As before, the seller has a default of b that is inconsistent with innovation,
the relative bargaining strength of the parties is reﬂected in the parameter α and the
default is binding in the bargaining process for the seller. In addition, assume the
seller has a discount factor of δ ∈ (0,1).
Given the stationarity of the model, the optimal action in any one period will also
be optimal in every period. Thus, if the seller does not wish to innovate, she will not
wish to innovate in any period.23 In that case, the discounted value of surplus to the
seller of delay is:
b + δb + δ
2b + δ




On the other hand, the value to the seller from immediate innovation is:
b + F1 + δαv + δ
2αv + δ




23Note that in this section it is implicitly assumed that payoﬀs cannot be carried over between
periods.
31As before, the buyer does not wish to delay innovation. The maximum innovation













b > (1 − δ + αδ)v. (20)
Unlike models with one-sided asymmetric information, the seller is willing to en-

















(1 − δ)2 > 0. (24)
The new variable here is the discount factor. Equation 24 shows that delay is
more likely the more patient the seller is.
The results of this model are similar to inﬁnite horizon games of tacit collusion,
32however, the emphasis here is reversed.24 Tacit collusion models examine whether
the threat of low future payoﬀs (punishment) is suﬃcient to sustain collusion without
cheating in the immediate term. On the other hand, in the model of delay the
emphasis is on whether the immediate reward (compensation) is suﬃcient to induce
the seller to accept a lower payoﬀ in the future. The impact of the discount factor
is also reversed. In the standard models of tacit collusion a higher discount factor
increases the incentive for the ﬁrm to cooperate. Here, a higher discount factor means
that the seller is more patient: consequently they require more compensation if they
are to agree to innovation.
Thus far in this section it has been assumed that payoﬀs cannot be carried over
between periods. Alternatively, the buyer could accumulate savings over several pe-
riods so as to have suﬃcient funds to compensate the seller adequately. Assume that
the buyer receives a small return r from each period of trading that occurs according
to the old default contract, where r is never binding and is suﬃciently small so as to
ensure that innovation is still optimal. Let the accumulated savings of the buyer be
represented by S. In this case, delay will occur when







so that the buyer will wish to accumulate savings b S = [b − v(1 − δ + αδ)]/(1 − δ) in
order to induce innovation. Delay in innovation will be longer the smaller is r and
the larger is b S.
24See Tirole (1988) Chapter 6.
338 Conclusions
The model developed in this paper generates delays in bargaining with: multiple
bargaining rounds; incomplete contracts; and wealth constraints. Unlike much of the
non-cooperative bargaining literature, delays may occur in equilibrium without the
presence of asymmetric information.
The model consisted of two periods and a buyer and seller. At the start of each
period a potential new reform or task was revealed to both parties, along with the
surplus that it could generate. If the parties agree to adopt the new innovation, they
bargained over the potential surplus. A party’s claim on surplus depended on their
default payoﬀ and their bargaining strength. An eﬀect of innovation was that the
seller lost her default payoﬀ (in the basic model) or her contemporaneous bargaining
power (in the drastic innovation model).
If the seller anticipates losing out in subsequent bargains from ﬁrst period reform,
she will be only willing to accept innovation if she is adequately compensated. This
may not be possible because of wealth constraints. Further, because the parties
cannot write a fully contingent contract, they are unable to implement reform on the
basis of a surplus sharing arrangement or a commitment to a future remuneration
scheme.
The basic model predicts that the incentive to delay for the seller is increasing in
the outside option, decreasing in current bargaining strength, decreasing in expected
surplus and increasing in the probability that future surplus is low. Allowing (drastic)
innovation to aﬀect the relative bargaining power of the parties alters these results.
34If innovation reduces the bargaining power of the seller, she is more likely to delay
when surplus is expected to be higher in the future (relative to the present potential
surplus). Similarly, a seller is more likely to delay a drastic innovation the higher the
level of her current bargaining strength.
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